Bruno Fernandes’ mutinous post-match comments at Como were widely and correctly condemned, most pertinently by an Old Trafford crowd who showed, once again, that their loyalty towards whoever is currently Manchester United manager is perhaps their most unique and commendable trait.

But just because Bruno shouldn’t have said it doesn’t mean the point itself was incorrect. Ultimately Fernandes was right – and the way Carrick deployed Mason Mount on Sunday afternoon tells us that, deep down, he knows it.

“Sometimes when you give too much of the ball to these teams, they get confidence,” Fernandes said on Tuesday. “I think sometimes we have to be more brave under pressure, take the risk of pressing high and making them uncomfortable.”

A pressing matter

Sitting back rather than pressing high: here is the simplest tactical summation of modern football’s great divide between the possession-heavy, hard-pressing super-clubs and the more low-block, counter-attacking teams who take them on. As Bruno suggests, Manchester United really ought to be in the former, not the latter.

Carrick, like Ole Gunnar Solskjaer before him, has coached Manchester United with the broad tactical brushstrokes of Sir Alex Ferguson, who, genius adapter that he was, would be the first to acknowledge that these old tactical ideas (midblock 4-4-2; counter-attack quickly down the flanks) are no longer suitable for a club of United’s stature.

Since Carrick’s appointment on January 13, Manchester United rank ninth in the Premier League for possession (51.5%), 13th for the best measure of pressing intensity we have: PPDA (13.2), and 12th for high turnovers (224). At the same time, they top the Premier League charts over the last nine months for direct attacks (105) and fast breaks (43). The data confirms that Carrick’s Manchester United have played like a Fergie team. But it’s 2026, and that makes Carrick a man out of time.

Clearly, the 3-0 defeat on Saturday had little to do with tactics. Nevertheless, Carrick’s plan was revealing, because by deploying Mount on the left – but instructing him to invert into the centre – Carrick created narrowness where usually he would want width on both flanks, preferring Giggs/Ronaldo/Nani types to explode on the break.

Instead we saw a box-midfield, and the foundations of a system that could help Youri Tielemans find passes through the lines (Emery’s Villa use this shape) and, more generally, help Manchester United seize the initiative. Here was a nod to modern possession-based football; to a way of playing that seeks control through meticulously planned passing networks. It was, of course, too little too late.

Criticism of Fernandes is perfectly reasonable. Nevertheless, the Manchester United board would do well to heed his advice when they pick the next one.